Supplementary Planning Document



July 2007





Foreword

This Supplementary Planning Document has been prepared to set out the design principles that the Council as Local Planning Authority will wish to be demonstrated in developments for the prevention of crime.

The document is the result of cooperation between West Yorkshire Police and the Council's Planning Service each bringing their knowledge and experience to contribute jointly to building Safer and Stronger Communities and to support the work of the Safer Communities Partnership.

The draft of this document underwent public consultation between April and June 2007 in accordance with the requirements of the Town and Country Planning (Local Development) (England) Regulations 2004. The Planning for Crime Prevention Supplementary Planning Document was adopted by the Council on 26th June 2007.

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Introduction

"Crime and the fear of crime affect the way people use and enjoy the places where they live, work and use for recreation..."

1.1 Replacement Unitary Development Plan

Paragraphs 9.33 and 9.34 of the Policy Framework section of the replacement Unitary Development Plan for the Bradford District state:

'Crime and the fear of crime affect the way people use and enjoy the places where they live, work and use for recreation. The design of the built environment can play a very significant part in reducing crime and disorder and cutting down the fear of crime.

Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 makes it a duty for local authorities to exercise its various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and disorder in its area.'1

1.2 What Does 'Planning for Crime Prevention' Mean?

The main objective of planning for crime prevention is to prevent or deter criminal activity and antisocial behaviour by reducing the availability of opportunities to commit crime, achieved through the careful design of buildings, streets and spaces to create safer and more pleasant environments.

Places which are designed to be safe and secure in the first instance create financial savings to the occupier in terms of not needing to make costly alterations to improve safety and security. These later alterations, such as fitting external shutters to doors and windows, can not only undermine the aesthetic appearance of a development, but they can also increase perceptions that an area is unsafe. Planning for crime prevention also provides financial savings to the wider community; as well designed buildings and spaces require fewer resources to police than those which do not consider potential crime risks at the design stage.

There is a misconception that planning for crime prevention produces lower quality development as it limits the freedom of the designer. This assumption is incorrect because planning for crime prevention requires designers to consider potential crime risks and to come up with

 $^{^{}m 1}$ City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council (2005) Replacement Unitary Development Plan for the Bradford District

"As a nation we can and must do better in reducing crime..."

design solutions which address these potential crime risks. A creative and high quality design is one which successfully addresses crime prevention alongside other design objectives. By addressing the potential crime risks at the design stage, development is more likely to be fit for purpose over its lifetime.

The causes of crime are a combination of social, economic and environmental factors. As 'planning for crime prevention' only deals with environmental factors, it cannot be expected to eradicate crime completely. However, a place where potential crime risks have been addressed as part of the design process should not only be safer, but can give its users a sense of well being and control over their surroundings. Careful design is therefore not a solution to crime in itself, but plays an important complementary role to initiatives to address the economic and social causes of crime.

Planning for crime prevention should be for everyone's benefit. The principles of planning for crime prevention should not be employed to promote the security of private spaces at the expense of the security of public spaces. Successful streets and neighbourhoods achieve a balance between the security of private and public spaces, benefiting both the private individual and the wider population.

1.3 National Context

Crime is one of the key issues to be addressed if the Government's goal of achieving sustainable communities is to be realised. The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) defined sustainable communities as:

'...places where people want to live and work, now and in the future. They meet the diverse needs of existing and future residents, are sensitive to their environment, and contribute to a high quality of life. They are safe and inclusive, well planned, built and run, and offer equality of opportunity and good services for all.' (www.odpm.gov. uk, March 2005).

This definition has been expanded by the Department for Communities and Local Government into eight factors which are all crucial in establishing sustainable communities. Sustainable communities are:

- Active, inclusive and safe
- Well run
- Environmentally sensitive
- Well designed and built
- Well connected
- Thriving
- Well served
- Fair for everyone²

In addition, the Government's Crime Reduction Strategy³ states:

"Making people feel safe in their homes and out on the streets is every bit as important as improving the education of our children or reducing the time that people must wait for operations. As a nation we can and must do better in reducing crime - we should be near the bottom, not at the top, of the international league table for recorded crimes".

Therefore crime prevention is a goal in itself as well as a means to achieving a sustainable urban renaissance. A safe environment is a key element of a sustainable and

attractive community and is achievable through the planning system.

The ODPM's Safer Places: The Planning System and Crime Prevention (2004), which was written in partnership with the Home Office, provides guidance on how planning can support sustainable communities through the creation of attractive, secure environments. There is an emphasis on the use of design as a tool for preventing crime and anti-social behaviour, and includes a number of examples of best practice.

Although it is a relatively new concept to planning, the issue of planning for crime prevention is becoming increasingly prominent and its importance is explicitly highlighted in Planning Policy Statement 1: Delivering Sustainable Development, and Planning Policy Statement 3: Housing. In addition the extent to which crime prevention has been addressed in a development proposal is an important component of Design and Access Statements, which are now a requirement for most planning applications. This is outlined in Circular 01/2006: Guidance on Changes to the Development Control System.

Secured By Design is the UK Police flagship initiative supporting the principles of crime prevention by design through the use of effective crime prevention and security standards for a range of applications. The initiative has proven successful in ensuring that new development and refurbishment can create well designed environments where incidences of crime and antisocial behaviour are much less frequent. Many of the best practice case studies used in Safer Places incorporate Secured By Design principles.

1.4 Local Context

Bradford District Community
Strategy: Delivering the Vision:
2002-2007 (City of Bradford
Metropolitan District Council, 2002)
identifies safer communities as one
of the seven priorities for the
Council if it is to achieve the aims
and objectives of the 2020 Vision.

The District's Safer Communities Strategy 2005-2008 supports the 2020 Vision and sets out two related outcomes for the Safer Communities Partnership:

Outcome 1: A district where people feel safe.

Outcome 2: A district with lower levels of crime, disorder, anti-social behaviour and substance abuse.

The Strategy identifies four priorities which must be achieved for the above outcomes to be realised. The first of these priorities is Visible Responses which states:

'The Partnership will ensure that people see the difference that it is making in the Bradford District. Local neighbourhoods should be pleasant places to live, work and visit, with low levels of graffiti, litter and anti-social behaviour. We will support work being done to improve the visible environment...'4

The Replacement Unitary
Development Plan (RUDP) is one
of the Council's strategic plans
which also supports the Community
Strategy. Accordingly, it contains
policies to ensure that new
development will be of a high
quality design and be safe and
secure.

The RUDP is complemented by Supplementary Planning Documents (SPDs) which provide further information and guidance in order to help implement particular RUDP policies. This 'Planning for Crime Prevention' guidance supports a number of RUDP policies, as outlined in Sections 1.5 and 4.0 of this document.

In order to improve the input West Yorkshire Police has into the planning process, the Police's Architectural Liaison Officers (ALOs) have been working within Bradford Council's planning offices since late 2006. This will improve the level of contact between the ALOs and planning officers and ensure that community safety is given greater prominence in planning decisions and planning policy. This SPD will be of particular use as a planning tool to the ALOs in their day-to-day work.

At present there are five other SPDs which have been adopted by the Council which support 'Planning for Crime Prevention'. Since these documents are all rooted in the policies of the RUDP, they carry equal weight in the planning system and are

intrinsically complementary to one another. These are:

- Sustainable Design Guide
- Bradford City Centre Design Guide
- Shopfront Design Guide
- Bradford City Centre Affordable Housing
- Planning Obligations

In addition there are earlier adopted Supplementary Planning Guidance (SPG) documents which support the policies of the Replacement Unitary Development Plan (RUDP). Of these, the Play Areas SPG contains guidance which is relevant and complementary to the content of the Planning for Crime Prevention SPD.

Royds: A Local Example of Best Practice in Designing out Crime⁵

Since 1994, a close partnership between Royds Community Association, the District Architectural Liaison Officer of West Yorkshire Police, and the Council has resulted in a dramatic fall in crime in the Royds area and substantial improvements in resident satisfaction and quality of life.

Led by Royds Community Association, Single Regeneration Budget funding was used to carry out environmental improvements, the refurbishment of dwellings, and the construction of new dwellings and community facilities. With all of these works, care was taken to ensure that buildings and properties would be secure and that the new development and refurbishment would foster a sense of community and ownership among the residents. The scheme recognised that environmental improvements alone would only go so far in lowering crime rates. At The Royds the underlying social problems of crime such as drug use were addressed as part of the wider project. The scheme also provided employment, experience and training for local young people, which ran in tandem with improving access to the job market.

By simultaneously addressing the social, economic and environmental contributors to crime, levels of crime have plummeted in The Royds neighbourhood. The improvements made to properties and the wider environment and the quality of new development in The Royds will benefit all existing and future residents of the area. The success of the scheme has resulted in it being used as an example of best practice by the ODPM in *Safer Places*.

⁵ Office of the Deputy Prime Minister & Home Office (2004) Safer Places and Crime Prevention

⁴ Bradford District Safer Communities Partnership (2005) Safer Communities Strategy 2005-2008.

1.5 The Purpose and Status of this Document

This guidance builds on current best practice and sets out how the design of new development and refurbishment can contribute to the creation of sustainable communities by helping to reduce crime and antisocial behaviour. The guidance will inform anyone who applies for planning permission, whether they are large-scale developers or householders, how their proposals can promote safety and security.

This guidance will function as a Supplementary Planning Document (SPD), linked to Saved Policies UDP3, D1, D4, D6 and D7of the Replacement UDP (RUDP). These policies have been reproduced in Section 4.0 of this document (pages 30-31). Of these policies, which promote high quality and liveable environments, Policy D4 can be seen as the 'headline' policy for this document:

D4: Development proposals should be designed to ensure a safe and secure environment and reduce opportunities for crime⁵

All planning applications are assessed against Policy D4.

In time, the RUDP will be replaced by the Local Development Framework (LDF). This guidance provides an elaboration of the RUDP and forthcoming LDF policies which concern high quality and secure design. When determining planning applications, the Council will treat this Guidance as a material consideration to the adopted RUDP or any subsequent LDF. Therefore developers must ensure that they demonstrate that they have applied the principles and guidance contained in this document and conform to the respective RUDP or LDF policies.

1.6 How to Use this Document

The principles of crime prevention through design are not limited to larger scale development or building from scratch. They are just as applicable to the extension, conversion or refurbishment of a building.

Similarly, it is often wrongly assumed that crime prevention measures are only needed in areas which are currently experiencing high or above average levels of crime. As crime levels and patterns can change during the lifetime of a building, it is important that potential crime risks are considered as part of the design regardless of where a development is proposed.

When preparing a planning application of any type or scale it is important to ensure that the guidance within this document has been taken on board to ensure that the proposals enhance community safety, as this document will be a material consideration in determining all planning applications. It is also advisable to liaise with a West Yorkshire Police Architectural Liaison Officer (ALO) at the earliest opportunity for site specific advice. The contact details for the ALOs are in Section 6 (page 34) of this document.

While this document will recommend certain design principles, it should not be presumed that any planning application which uses these principles will be automatically be given planning permission. All planning decisions are made having assessed all relevant policies of the RUDP and the forthcoming LDF, and any other material considerations.

Planning for Crime Prevention: The Core Principles

There are five components of securely designed buildings and spaces that experience shows can make criminal or anti-social activity less likely to occur.
These are:

- i) defensible space
- ii) natural surveillance
- iii) safe permeability
- iv) property security
- v) maintenance

Design that successfully incorporates these components has been proven to substantially reduce the opportunity for crime. This section will look at these five components in turn and Section 3.0 of this guide will show how these principles can be applied in different situations to improve security.

Core Principle 1: Defensible Space

Spaces should be clearly defined in terms of ownership and use. The distinction between public and private space can be achieved through a combination of physical and symbolic means. The distinction between public and private space gives a clear indication of where members of the public are welcome, and strengthens personal control over private space.

Communal, shared and public spaces are the lifeblood of any local community. Spaces for meeting and sharing are an indicator of a mature, cohesive



These railings and gates form a physical and symbolic boundary between the public space of the street and the private property of the home.

community and should be encouraged as they support sustainable communities.

By nature, public spaces invite anyone to use them. However, poor design can appear to invite the public into private spaces, thereby increasing the potential for crime and antisocial behaviour.

Where development is intended to encourage public access, such as retail, commercial or leisure, the creation of defensible space may not be necessary, as these types of development rely on people being able to easily come and go. By contrast, the creation of defensible space is vital to the security of dwellings and providing piece of mind to people in their own homes, as it is only right that people should be able to exercise an element of control (be it physical or psychological) over who can access their property.

The blurring of public and private space has the effect of making potential offenders much more confident and find greater opportunity in areas where they are unlikely to be noticed, recognised or challenged. At the same time the owners or occupiers of private space will be less able and therefore less likely to exercise

control over their private space. People tend to exercise a high degree of influence over private space, such as their garden or other land associated with their building. This control and influence diminishes rapidly as space becomes increasingly 'public' in character.

Creating defensible space has the simple aim of designing the physical environment in a way that allows the occupiers to control the areas around their buildings or in semi-private communal use. Defensible space is clearly owned, strongly defined, and has good natural surveillance. Real and symbolic barriers reinforce the definition. Space is allocated and organised as far towards the private end of the spectrum as possible. This substantially increases the occupiers' confidence in exercising ownership, influence and informal social control over their environment.

If people do not identify an area as belonging to them, they will not feel they have a right to control or determine the activity taking place within it. This lack of direct ownership, influence and control creates indefensible space and invites antisocial behaviour.

Core Principle 2: Natural Surveillance

The more overlooked a space, entranceway or building is, the more secure it will be as it is 'supervised' by people either inside buildings or outside of them. The higher potential for being seen in areas with high levels of natural surveillance deters potential offenders and gives the occupiers a stronger sense of ownership of the public and private areas they can see.

Although not an effective crime prevention measure in isolation, the passive overlooking of space provided by natural surveillance can help to reduce the potential for crime and antisocial behaviour when used in conjunction with the other 'Core Principles' of this document. Therefore natural surveillance plays a key complementary role to the other 'Core Principles'.

Natural surveillance should not be confused with formal surveillance, such as CCTV, which is in place specifically to continually monitor particular spaces or entranceways. Natural surveillance, which is also known as 'eyes on the street', is a more informal way of controlling activity in streets because of the perception of being overlooked.

By contrast, when spaces are overlooked by blank building elevations, or contain areas which cannot be seen from within buildings, offenders feel more confident that they will not be seen by anyone, and less likely to be challenged. Crime and anti social behaviour are more likely to occur in public and semi-public areas which are hidden from view.

Well designed lighting, including street lighting, is particularly important to facilitate natural surveillance at all times in the day.

Core Principle 3: Safe Permeability

A liveable balance must be achieved between the need to promote permeability, the choice of routes through an area and the need to prevent uncontrolled and unwelcome access to private spaces and buildings.

A permeable and user friendly town centre or mixed use neighbourhood provides an appropriate choice of convenient and attractive ways around, which in turn promotes walking and cycling. This adds to the vitality of streets and spaces, and in turn makes them safer for everyone.

While a high level of permeability is crucial to the vitality and perceptions of safety of areas such as town centres which are primarily in retail, commercial and leisure use, predominantly residential areas require a lower level of permeability due to the simple fact that these areas tend to be less busy, therefore it would be undesirable to spread street activity too thinly. Quiet, poorly designed and inactive routes through a residential area can act as venues for antisocial behaviour and criminal activity.

Whether development is residential or not, a local assessment and creative design are required to ensure that places are both well-connected and secure.

Uncontrolled and poorly designed routes give potential offenders the means of accessing the most vulnerable ways into a private property. Examples of places with easy access opportunities might be a suburban housing estate where dwellings stand in unstructured parkland, or an open service access behind commercial buildings in a town centre.

By making it more difficult for offenders to access the vulnerable parts of buildings (such as the side or rear) and giving routes through an area a well defined and structured layout, crime and antisocial behaviour are less likely.

Core Principle 4: Property Security

The more difficult it is to get into a building or property through the use of robust, lockable doors and windows and controlling access through site or property entrances the stronger the deterrent to crime.

Potential offenders often choose easier targets than harder targets. In terms of private property easier targets are those with open access or easily climbable boundaries, and openings without proper security. The more difficult it is for a potential offender to get into a building, the greater the deterrent to trespass.

Lockable gates (or other means of controlling access), physical boundary features, and robust lockable doors and windows all reduce the likelihood of private property being broken into. However, good design will balance achieving an appropriate level of security with achieving other design objectives such as aesthetics, access for people with disabilities, and so on.

The Police's Secured By Design initiative recommends certain types of windows, doors, locks and other security measures which satisfy the Police's security standards. Please refer to Design Principle M (page 28) for further details.

Core Principle 5: Maintenance

A clean and well-maintained environment is symbolically important: it gives out the message that people care about and exercise control over the area, and that anti-social behaviour will not be tolerated.

Places that are strewn with litter, neglected, overgrown or marked with graffiti are a visual blight. The fact that it takes time for a place to fall into neglect or to fall into misuse gives the potential offender the message that nobody exercises ownership or controls what happens in this place, and therefore crime or antisocial behaviour are highly likely to go unchallenged.

These signs act as an invitation for more serious offences or acts of antisocial behaviour. For example. the presence of litter may encourage dumping which presents a health and safety hazard; and unmanaged vacant property or open space can invite trespass, misuse and nuisance to neighbours. An often quoted example of the importance of maintenance is the 'broken window theory' whereby if a single pane of glass or window is broken, and this broken window is not attended to. other windows and panes of glass and windows will be broken because the lack of maintenance sends out the message that no one cares about this building and that criminal behaviour of this kind is acceptable in this location, thereby encouraging an escalation.

An environment which is looked after by the people who use it implies a strong community spirit and a strong sense of ownership over the area, which suggests to a potential offender that they are more likely to be challenged. To law abiding citizen, a well maintained environment can help to reduce the fear of crime, unlike dirty, neglected and vandalised environments which increase the fear of crime.

Planning for Crime Prevention: Applying the Core Principles



This section of the Guide applies the five Core Principles (which are set out in Section 2.0) to the following four themes:

- 1. Secure Property Boundaries: primarily applying Core Principle 1: Defensible Space and Core Principle 4: Secure Permeability.
- 2. Safer Streets, Safer
 Neighbourhoods: applying all
 Core Principles to improve the
 security of all users of a typical
 street space, from the occupiers of
 buildings, to motorists, cyclists, and
 pedestrians
- **3. Secure Vehicle Parking:** applying all Core Principles to provide secure cycle, motorcycle and car parking
- **4. Secure Buildings:** primarily applying Core Principle 4: Target Hardening.

For each of these themes, the Guide sets out a number of *Design Principles* which new development must adhere to in order to improve security and safety. Below each *Design Principle* are bullet points which provide practical advice and information about how the Design Principle can be implemented, and identifies potential management issues

The **Design Principles** under each of the above themes should be read together, and not in isolation from one another, as they all carry equal weight.

3.1 Secure Property Boundaries

In keeping with the core principle of defensible space, development, but particularly residential development, needs to have a clear demarcation between public and private space to protect private property and deter trespass and anti social behaviour. Defensible space can be achieved by a combination of physical and psychological means.

Design Principle A: Creating Defensible Space

Where appropriate, property boundaries of new development should be demarcated by attractive boundary features which provide a clear indication of where public space meets private space. Where appropriate, these boundary features should provide a physical barrier between public and private space, accompanied by a means of controlling access onto private property.

- It must be established from the outset whether setting buildings back from the street is appropriate in terms of the existing character or land use of an area. Areas where it may not be appropriate to set buildings back from the road include the city, town and village centres; some conservation areas; key transport corridors or areas where the prevailing land use is industrial or commercial. In most other circumstances buildings. particularly dwellings, should be set back from the street behind a small, semi-public space behind a low wall, railing or fence which acts as a buffer between the public space of the street and the private space inside the building. The boundary and buffer space should be well designed and make a positive contribution to the overall quality of the development.
- The front boundaries to dwellings should allow an unrestricted view



from the building into public space. Walls and railings between 900mm and 1.0 metre high are suitable. Higher front boundaries can appear unsightly, restrict natural surveillance and create potential hiding places.

- Dividing boundaries between dwellings at the rear is essential to prevent an offender 'plot hopping' along a run of properties to find the most vulnerable target and then easily escaping. Rear divisions are also required to provide privacy and to reduce the potential for annoyance between neighbours. This fencing should be a minimum height of 1.5 metres. Higher fencing, up to 1.8 metres, may be required in areas of greater risk although this can lead to a development feeling 'boxed in'.
- Care should be taken to ensure that a balance is achieved between achieving secure property boundaries and creating an attractive development which responds to its context.

This suburban 'street block' layout means that all of the rear garden areas border each other and are buffered from public space by the houses and semiprivate front gardens.

- The Police's Secured By Design initiative provides additional guidance on achieving secure property boundaries.
- Open-plan frontages do not provide a robust, clearly defined separation of the private and public realm and are open to abuse.
 There will be a strong presumption against open plan development.

Design Principle B: Secure Private Space

New development should ensure that private spaces are buffered from public space by defensible semi-private space wherever possible. Access controls and appropriate boundary walls, railings or fences should be employed wherever practical to prevent intrusion into private space. Development where wholly private space directly adjoins public space needs to be avoided.

- As fully private spaces, such as the back garden of a house or the service yard to a commercial building or factory are often the least overlooked spaces (and therefore have the lowest level of natural surveillance), it is particularly important that they are protected from unwelcome access.
- An effective way of protecting private space is through adopting a 'street block' layout where the

- public street spaces are bounded by semi-private, defensible spaces and buildings which surround a central core of private space. In suburban residential areas, this would mean houses and semiprivate front gardens facing onto the street, with a protected 'pool' of interlocking rear gardens which do not border public space. This same principle can be applied to town and city centre 'blocks' where a central private courtyard space is shielded from public space by the surrounding buildings.
- Where the scale of development is smaller than a street block, it is necessary to assess the likely crime risks associated with the surrounding pattern of development and to create a design which offers the best level of protection from these risks.
- Alleyways can provide a concealed route for offenders into private spaces. There will be a strong presumption against creating new alleyways gated or

- otherwise. Similarly, placing private space (such as back gardens, or private car parking) next to public space (such as open land, public footpaths, ind-ustrial and railway property) needs to be avoided as this can mean there is nothing more than a fence or wall between public space and the most vulnerable ways into a building.
- Private areas need to be secure from intrusion and access to them must be in the control of the occupier. In residential development this might mean lockable gates between front and rear gardens, and in commercial buildings, monitored service areas with gated access where practical. Occupiers of buildings are much more willing to exercise ownership, influence and control over private, clearly defined space.
- The rear and side of dwellings are the favoured attack area for burglars. These vulnerable areas require protection from fencing, railings or walls to a minimum



- height of 1.8 metres. The intention is to create a secure rear and side enclosure to deny access to unobserved windows and doors. Boundary features between houses, preventing access to the side and rear, need to be sited as far forward as possible. Gates connected to this boundary should be lockable and of matching height. A barrier between front and rear gardens that must be climbed in full view at the front of the house is a good deterrent.
- In residential development, wherever possible, rear gardens should back onto one another.
 Such interlocking rear gardens provide significant additional protection and privacy.
- Dividing boundaries between dwellings at the rear is essential to prevent an offender 'plot hopping' along a run of properties to find the most vulnerable target and then easily escaping. Rear divisions are also required to provide privacy and to reduce the potential for annoyance between neighbours. This fencing should be a minimum height of 1.5 metres. Higher fencing, up to 1.8 metres, may be required in areas of greater risk although this can lead to a development feeling 'boxed in'.
- Where they cannot be avoided, the more easily accessible rear gardens (for example, bordering open land, public footpaths, industrial and railway property) are potentially at increased risk and should be provided with extra protection. This could be achieved through a taller boundary feature or thorny shrubs planted alongside of the fence can be a useful alternative, or complementary, measure. Care must be taken to ensure that these measures are well maintained and do not compromise natural surveillance from inside the house to the area outside of its boundary.

- If fencing is used, the horizontal support rails should always be on the inside (in the private space) to avoid them becoming a 'ladder' over the fence.
- If boundary walls are used, they should not have a flat, horizontal top, which are very easy to scale and inviting for youths to sit and run upon. Such unintended congregation points can cause considerable annoyance. A triangular or other profiled coping is better.
- Care should be taken with the positioning of boundary walls, sheds, fall pipes and fencing, which can easily become unintended ladders onto roofs and into property.

3.2 Safer Streets, Safer Neighbourhoods

While it would be impossible and undesirable to privatise all public space by controlling who uses it and when, the core principles of planning for crime prevention, particularly that of natural surveillance, can be used to design informal control into development to make public spaces safer and enhance the sense of well being of users of public space.

The principles of planning for crime prevention should not be employed to promote the security of private spaces at the expense of the security of public spaces. For example, high walls, inward facing buildings and a single controlled access to the site may make a property secure on the inside, but can make the street outside seem forlorn and even threatening. Successful streets and neighbourhoods achieve a balance between the security of private and public spaces, benefiting both the private individual and the wider population. This section sets out how the general application of the core principles set out in Section 2.0 of this guide can be used to improve the security of all users of a typical street space or neighbourhood, from the occupiers of buildings, to motorists, cyclists, and pedestrians with the aim of making communities safer.

Natural surveillance should be used in conjunction with the other Core Principles in Section 2 in order for it to be effective in helping to reduce crime and antisocial behaviour. When used in isolation, natural surveillance is not an effective crime prevention measure.

Design Principle C: Creating Natural Surveillance

The principal or most active elevations of all new buildings should be oriented to provide natural surveillance. New development should enhance the safety of the users of spaces

- and the security of parked vehicles by having windows on the ground and upper floors on all elevations which overlook streets and other spaces. Strong justification would be required for new buildings which do not provide natural surveillance.
- Buildings which present their most active frontage to adjoining space enhance security by encouraging natural surveillance and activity.
- Where buildings face onto more than one space, such as at a street corner or with a road on one side and a canal towpath on the other, it is important from a security perspective to have windows overlooking both spaces and to have the principal or most active frontage of the building facing onto one of these spaces.
- Blank elevations should be avoided, as these provide no natural surveillance, increasing the opportunity for crime and antisocial behaviour.





This corner building has been designed to provide natural surveillance over both of the streets it faces on to.

- The internal layouts of buildings should ensure that the most well used or 'busiest' rooms of the building are those which have windows overlooking space. In houses this would be the living rooms and dining/kitchen areas; in an office building this would be the workspace. This maximises the opportunity for natural surveillance through the windows of the building.
- Natural surveillance just as important in enhancing the security of private spaces as public spaces, therefore private spaces in a development should benefit from natural surveillance.

Design Principle D: Security Through Sightlines

New development should conform to a building line to maximise the visibility of the street and other public spaces from each building. Similarly, where present, the boundary features of new development should line up with neighbouring boundary features to form a continuous boundary between public and private space.

- If all of the buildings are set back a similar distance from the street, it means that the view of the street from one building is not restricted because a neighbouring building blocks the view. By following a building line, the potential for natural surveillance from each building is maximised.
- The principal elevation(s) of new development needs to encourage natural surveillance both from within buildings and from streets to private property.
- New development should not create 'blind spots' or recesses which are largely hidden from view, as such areas can attract crime and antisocial behaviour.

 Wherever landscaping is used, it is important to consider the impact of the landscape on sightlines as it matures.

Design Principle E: Security Through Lighting

New development should incorporate appropriate lighting to protect people and property from crime and antisocial behaviour during hours of darkness.

- A well-designed lighting scheme will ensure that the advantages of designing in good natural surveillance are not just limited to daylight hours.
- Lighting should be white rather than the orangey-yellow of low pressure sodium lighting. White light makes colours and people easier to recognise.
- Light fittings should be energy efficient to save on costs and resources used.
- Lighting should be targeted to features which would benefit most from lighting, such as pavements and footpaths, entrances, car parks and parking spaces. Light should not be wasted or cause nuisance or light pollution.
- Lighting should be designed into schemes rather than an afterthought. This way lighting is less likely to have a negative impact on the appearance of development, and allows lighting to be targeted more effectively.
- Lighting should meet the relevant British Standard or its replacement.
- Dimmer controls, timing systems and photosensitive lighting should be used in areas where a consistent level of lighting is not required all through the night.
- Where lighting is installed, particularly in communal, public or

- semi-public areas, the lighting system requires regular monitoring and maintenance to ensure it is fulfilling its purpose.
- Lighting need to be difficult to vandalise in terms of the robustness of the materials used and the location of light fittings and controls.
- Passive Infra Red (PIR) or 'movement activated' lighting should be avoided as it is ineffective at reducing crime whilst at the same time increasing fear of crime and causing annoyance. Its use is not supported by West Yorkshire Police who's strong preference is for evenly distributed white light that is constant in degree of illumination, low energy and operates between dusk and dawn.



The office units over these shops provide additional 'eyes' on the street and improve the safety of public space.

Design Principle F: Security Through Active Frontages

Ground floor street level retail, catering and commercial use in buildings helps to provide activity by the passage of visitors and occupiers, the view into the premises and the view out from the premises. Active frontages to the street should be included wherever this is practical.

Where shops and other commercial buildings open out onto the street, they increase natural surveillance and bring activity into public spaces. This increases the safety and security of the street during opening hours.


BUT it is also important that when out of hours, these frontages do not make an area feel unsafe e.g. by solid roller shutters. (See the Shopfront SPD - in draft at time of writing this SPD.)

 Commercial development should avoid inactive frontages wherever the building adjoins public or semipublic space. Internal malls or offices standing on a plinth of car parking should be avoided, as these create 'dead' frontages which compromise the safety of users of the adjoining public space.

Design Principle G: Security Through Mixed Use

Wherever appropriate and possible, sites should accommodate a complementary mix of uses which will be mutually beneficial to the different occupiers in terms of security and amenity.

- The 'zoning' of different land uses has created situations where areas are devoid of activity at certain times of day, such as housing estates during working hours or retail areas in the evening. This lack of activity (and therefore levels of natural surveillance) in different locations at different times of day is conducive to crime and antisocial behaviour. This problem can be overcome by mixing land uses wherever this is practical.
- When mixing uses, care must be taken to ensure that the privacy and quality of life of each occupant is maintained by addressing the impacts of amenity, noise, maintenance, access, parking, lighting and so on early in the design stage. It is not the place of this SPD to define what types of development are complementary, as each planning application for mixed use and change of use will be determined on its own merits.
- In order to enhance security, it is important for different uses in the same building to have their own, secure private entrances and clear separations between the uses.
 This is particularly important where residential uses are concerned, in order to create an element of defensible space and improve security.
- The occupiers of buildings in areas which contain a mix of residential and retail or commercial or leisure uses benefit in terms of security from the presence of the users of other buildings at times of the day when their own buildings are empty. To give a simple



example, a flat over a shop provides surveillance over the shop whilst it is closed at night, while during the day the activity generated by the shop would deter the burglary of the flat whilst the occupier is out. The continual presence of the different users of buildings at all times of the day means that the building, its curtilage and the wider street benefit in security terms.

The mixture of flats and offices over these shops increases natural surveillance and means the building is occupied 24 hours a day.

Design Principle H: Security Through Mixed Housing Types

Residential development should improve security by incorporating a mixture of dwelling sizes and types.

- A mix of household types can help avoid a situation where the occupants of housing are either all at home or all out. For example, a block of one bed flats for professionals will be empty during working hours and potentially vulnerable to crime, but if the same housing was combined with housing for families and the elderly, there will be activity during the day, helping to make properties safer.
- The concentration of family housing in small geographical areas can potentially result in the nuisance and antisocial behaviour

sometimes associated with bored vouths. Housing aimed at only one type of user can possibly mean that all occupants have similar lifestyles, resulting in there being very few people around at certain times of the day or week. Meanwhile criminals might target particular areas of housing as they may be seen as easy targets (such as clusters of housing for elderly people) or the rewards of crime richer. A 'village' or 'urban village' style mixture of housing types and tenures would mean residential areas are occupied by a wider variety of people, and is potentially less likely to suffer the problems which are exacerbated by the concentration of certain tenures or social groups.

 The level of security across development should be uniform regardless of housing, type, level of affordability, or indeed tenure.

Design Principle I: Safer Streets

The design of streets should promote the safety and security of all users.

The design of streets so that roadways, cycleways and pavements are all in one place rather than segregated will make them better populated and therefore safer. In most locations in the district this would mean having pavements and cycleways next to roadways, but in quiet residential streets a shared surface might be appropriate. The key aim is to ensure that different users of the street can see each other, making the street feel safer and more inviting, particularly at night. Isolated footpaths or cycle-ways and features such as sub-ways must be avoided.



- Natural surveillance of streets from buildings, particularly the most convenient routes through an area, should be maximised.
- The lighting of streets should accord with Design Principle E of this Guide.
- The design and landscaping of streets should avoid creating potential hiding places or obstructions to natural surveillance by the users of the street space or from adjacent buildings. This includes making sure that wheelie bins and skips are not in the street, but in private or semi-private space.
- Street spaces should be kept clean and be well-maintained to send the message out that people care about the street and that disorderly behaviour will not be tolerated. This should include the prompt removal of graffiti, litter and repairing damage caused by vandals.
- Gardens, landscaping and car parks adjoining the street should be kept clean and be well maintained, to reinforce the appearance of control and ownership over the area by its community. Ownerless 'left over space' in layouts must be avoided.
- Planting and landscaping will require regular maintenance. Tree canopies should not be allowed to fall below 2.5 metres in height and hedges and other plants which may form a screen should not be allowed to not grow too tall. Car park hedges should be less than 0.5 metres tall.

Design Principle J: Safer Footpaths and Cycleways

Footpaths or cycleways which are isolated from the wider street network should be avoided where possible. Where footpaths and cycleways are necessary as a legitimate element of the wider street network, they must be well over-looked by buildings, well lit and well used.

- It is acknowledged that in order to promote healthier modes of transport, such as walking and cycling, settlements need a safe and convenient network of footpaths and cycleways which may not necessarily coincide with the layout of the vehicle network.
- As these routes will tend to be less busy due to the lack of passing vehicle traffic, it is especially important to ensure that the users of these footpaths and cycleways benefit from good levels of natural surveillance from nearby buildings.
- Footpaths and cycleways should provide a clear and convenient route which links logically with destinations and reduces the opportunities for crime and antisocial behaviour. Ideally, they need to provide the primary access to buildings and connect busy streets.

- A dense, unclear network of segregated footpaths and cycle-ways will have fewer users and will hence be less safe and unacceptable. The lack of activity also raises security issues for the properties adjoining the network, as offenders would be less likely to be seen or heard.
- Footpaths and cycleways should not inadvertently provide an easy or secluded way into private space.
 They must be carefully designed into new development to minimise the potential for crime and antisocial behaviour.
- Footpaths and cycleways need to follow a clearly defined route with clearly defined edges so there is no ambiguity between the route and private space.
- The lighting of these routes should accord with Design Principle E of this Guide.
- The design and landscaping of footpaths and cycleways should avoid creating potential hiding places or obstructions to natural surveillance by the users of the route or from adjacent buildings.
- Footpaths and cycleways should be kept clean and be wellmaintained to send the message out that people care about them and that disorderly behaviour will not be tolerated. This should include the prompt removal of graffiti, litter and repairing damage caused by vandals.

3.3 Secure Vehicle Parking

Second to a house, the private car is the most important and expensive purchase most people will make and motorists have an expectation that they should be able to park safely and in close proximity to their home. Other destinations such as workplaces, shops, doctors' surgeries, places of worship often provide off-street parking, particularly for people with disabilities. Similarly, on and offstreet parking provision must be made for other modes of transport, such as bicycle, motorcycle and scooter.

Improving the security of parked vehicles can involve the use of defensible space and natural surveillance to deter vehicle crime in conjunction with access control, lockable gates and ensuring the vehicle is itself locked and physically secure.

A balance must be struck between creating safe and convenient car and cycle parking and an attractive, high quality design. A car littered streetscape due to inadequate parking provision can have a damaging visual impact. An environment littered with inappropriate parking is not just unpleasant; it is a major contributor to car crime and, potentially, tension between neighbours. The problems encountered in layouts vulnerable to car crime. such as segregated communal parking, are acknowledged and the lessons learnt from these unsuccessful sites should be considered when deciding the appropriate approach for new developments. Consequently, this guide aims to give balanced advice as to how car and cycle parking can be accommodated, whilst respecting the appearance and quality of the streetscape.

Design Principle K: Secure Cycle Parking

Where appropriate, new development should make provision for an appropriate quantity of secure parking for bicycles, motorcycles and scooters. Physical means of locking cycles is required, as is an adequate degree of natural surveillance and is conveniently close location to the building(s) it serves.

• In security terms, the best cycle parking is both off-street, where it is inside defensible space and indoors where the ways in can be made physically secure. Cycles stored in cages built in to a building on a site with a boundary wall and gates will be more secure from theft than ones chained to a stand in the street.



- Wherever practical, cycles should be stored or parked in defensible private, or semi-private space which benefits from good levels of natural surveillance. The sense of control and overlooking will deter criminal activity and antisocial behaviour.
- Popular destinations, such as the city, town and village centres, will require cycle parking within the public realm in a convenient location. Such provision should be in a busy, well-overlooked location where cycles can be locked or caged and therefore less vulnerable to theft or damage.
- It is important to consider cycle parking at the design stage rather than as an afterthought. The care gone into designing attractive and secure cycle parking can enhance the visual appearance of a development as well as maximising the security of the cycles and the potential for their use.

- Where it can be shown that measures have been put in place to deter criminal activity and antisocial behaviour, cycle parking of any type can be vetted by the Police and receive a the Safer Parking Award: 'Park Mark'.
- Cycle parking should be of a high quality design and complement or enhance the wider street scene. The scale and type of cycle parking in the public realm should be appropriate to its location and should not hinder pedestrian flows or detract from important views.

Design Principle L: Secure Car Parking

The layout of new development should create secure on- and off-street parking by ensuring spaces have an adequate degree of natural surveillance from the buildings they serve and are conveniently close to these buildings.

- The provision of parking should reflect demand. An overprovision results in inactive, wasted space which has security implications, while an under provision can result in illegal parking which itself could be seen as a form of antisocial behaviour and downgrades the quality of the local environment.
- In security terms, the best parking is off-street, where the parking is secure and on-site. This means that vehicles are parked indoors, where the entrances can be made physically secure, and



within defensible space. For suburban housing, this would mean a garage within the curtilage of the house, but in the town and city centres flats, offices, large retail and leisure developments and other buildings which might require a significant number of parking spaces, this would mean underground or multi-storey car parks with access control and formal surveillance such as CCTV.

- Where garages, multi-storey or subterranean parking are inappropriate, the next most secure option is to have car parking off street inside a defensible space into which access can be controlled. For a single dwelling, this should be a driveway with lockable gates. For an office or factory, this would be on site parking with a security barrier and CCTV. Natural surveillance from buildings is also key.
- The next most secure parking is well overlooked and well lit onstreet parking, which is close to the building(s) it serves. These spaces can also usefully function as visitor parking.
- Large, open and unsupervised areas of communal car parking should be avoided, as these are highly vulnerable to crime. Their scale and the lack of control over who enters the site means that criminal activity and anti-social behaviour can go unnoticed or unchallenged.
- Where garages are constructed, care must be taken to ensure that they do not impede natural surveillance of the property and the wider street, and do not unduly present the street with an inactive frontage.
- Parking positions should be clearly defined and in direct relationship to the buildings and property boundaries to increase the users' sense of ownership.

- Communal parking areas should be in small groups close and adjacent to the buildings they serve and with good natural surveillance. Where possible, the boundaries should be demarcated with railings or fencing and provide a narrowed, well-defined entrance. This can create or reinforce the impression that the area is under the influence and informal control of the occupiers, and that offenders might not find escape easy - a useful deterrent. Such sites require particular care to be taken with the positioning of footpaths, which can greatly facilitate car crime by providing access opportunities and escape routes.
- Communal garage blocks should be avoided. Experience shows that they become play areas for youths, are heavily vandalised and under used by residents.
- Loose surface, or gravel, drives have a number of disadvantages. When laid, they do not provide a strongly defined, clearly owned defensible space between properties that is required if the occupiers are to exercise ownership, influence and informal social control. The result can be disputes over ownership and use between neighbours. Loose surface drives can be problematic for the disabled and result in the adjacent highway becoming less safe for all pedestrians as the surface material is displaced onto the footpath. Loose-surface treatments require maintenance and can be used as missiles. The more that the need for maintenance is designed in, the more unlikely it becomes that this burden will be consistently borne by residents. Some will continue to take this unnecessary trouble but some will not and hence damaging signals of decline can begin.

- Car parking areas should be well illuminated to provide the potential for natural surveillance during the hours of darkness. Lighting should operate throughout the hours of darkness and be installed to prevent light pollution. For reference, *British Standard 5489 Part 1: 2003* provides a benchmark for lighting parking areas.
- Where it can be shown that measures have been put in place to deter criminal activity and antisocial behaviour, car parks of any type can be vetted by the police and receive a Safer Parking Award: 'Park Mark'.

3.4 Secure Property

The physical security of ground floor and accessible openings is vitally important to the security of buildings. Windows, doors and other openings are the entry points and the last line of defence. Good quality products can have a substantial (and often underestimated) impact in preventing forced entries, which contributes to deterring further offences within a development.

Conversely, easy entry will attract offenders to a site. By specifying and installing more secure doors, windows and other openings, such as those with Secured By Design accreditation, access opportunities into a building will be reduced.

Design Principle M: Physically Secure Buildings

Where appropriate, planning conditions will be sought to provide new development with secure windows, doors and other openings certificated to the relevant British Standard or its recognised equivalent.

- At time of writing British Standard BS 8220 sets out how to secure buildings against crime, and includes securing doors, windows and other openings. The Standard is divided into three parts:
- 1: Dwellings,
- 2: Offices and Shops, and
- 3: Storage, Industrial and Distribution Premises.
- For dwellings, the Police's Secured By Design initiative recommends windows which meet the requirements of British Standard BS 7950.
- For dwellings, the Police's Secured By Design initiative recommends doors (including patio and French doors) which meet the requirements of PAS 24-1.

- The Secured By Design website (www.securedbydesign.com) provides links to suppliers of windows which meet the requirements of BS 7950, doors which meet PAS 24-1.
- In some instances, doors and windows meeting the Secured By Design recommended standard may not be suitable, such as in the case of listed buildings, or may not be appropriate in terms of area character, such as in conservation areas. In these cases, windows and doors which comply with British Standard Institute (BSI), the British Board of Agrement (BBA), BM TRADA, or the Building Research Establishment (BRE) should be specified. This ensures that they are of a suitably strong and robust construction and have strong, robust locks. In the case of sash windows, it is possible to restrict how far they can be opened.
- All doors and windows should satisfy the requirements of the Fire Regulations in terms of providing suitable means of escape and not unduly hindering access by firefighters.
- When apartments are proposed, developers will be required to provide a thorough access control Strategy for access to the building and movement within the building.
- When apartments are proposed, developers should ensure that mail can be delivered to the occupants of the building in a manner that does not compromise the security of the apartments. Door-to-door delivery within apartment buildings is unacceptable.
- Wherever alarms and CCTV are to be installed, they should be considered early on in the design stage, not only to maximise their effectiveness (such as ensuring CCTV has clear sightlines), but also to ensure that they do not look like bolted on afterthoughts which undermine the quality of the design.

Note: uPVC has a short lifespan and is environmentally damaging in its manufacture and decay. Timber is a robust, long lasting material which is also environmentally friendly. Recycled aluminium is another sustainable choice. Please refer to the Council's Sustainable Design Guide SPD for further information about window and door materials.

Design Principle N: Physically Secure Shopfronts

The design of new shopfronts should ensure that the premises are secure, while still maintaining a visually attractive face to the street.

- The Council's Shopfront Design Guide SPD (currently at draft stage) provides detailed guidance as to how the needs of security and aesthetics can be achieved through design.
- At time of writing British Standard BS 8220 sets out how to secure buildings against crime, and includes securing doors, windows and other openings. The Standard is divided into three parts:
- 1: Dwellings,
- 2: Offices and Shops, and
- 3: Storage, Industrial and Distribution Premises.

Policy Context of the Designing Out Crime SPD

The status of this guidance as a Supplementary Planning Document (SPD) to the adopted Replacement Unitary Development Plan (RUDP) and the Local Development Framework (LDF) is outlined in 1.5 (page 7) of this document. The Supplementary Planning Document will be reviewed after three years of adoption, but will otherwise remain in force.

This section reproduces the saved policies of the RUDP which are relevant to the Designing Out Crime SPD. This section begins with the full text accompanying Policy D4:

Crime Prevention Through Improved Design

Crime and the fear of crime affect the way people use and enjoy the places where they live, work and use for recreation. The design of the built environment can play a very significant part in reducing crime and disorder and cutting down the fear of crime.

Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 makes it a duty for local authorities to exercise its various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and disorder in its area.

Safety and tackling the fear of crime is a priority for the Council and is a key element in Bradford's Vision 2020. A Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy which seeks to tackle the key crime and disorder problems facing communities in the District, has been produced by the Bradford Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership, which involves the Council, police and other key bodies. One of the key aims of the strategy is to create a safer environment for all those living, working, shopping, playing and investing in the District. The strategy identifies 6 key priorities for action. Planning has an important role to play in furthering the aims of the Strategy; for example, tackling house and commercial burglary and tackling the fear of crime and improving the quality of life for all communities.

Successful crime prevention often depends on a wide range of measures in which the planning process can assist in 'designing out crime' at the outset of the design process. Revised PPG12 draws attention to the need to include measures for crime prevention in the social considerations of a development plan (para 4.14), emphasising the role of better urban design. Circular 5/946 'Planning Out Crime', states that crime prevention is capable of being a material consideration in determining planning applications

and sets out advice on the planning considerations relating to crime prevention. It advises that development plans should establish principles for the design, layout and landscaping of new development which aim to make crime more difficult to commit, increase the risk of detection and provide people with a safer, more secure environment. However, any solution should remain sensitive to local circumstances and there should be a balanced approach to design which attempts to reconcile the visual quality of a development with the needs of crime prevention. Developments can be made more secure without resorting to razor wire, grilles, bars, unsightly types of fencing and other visually intrusive security measures, if safety and security is considered at an early stage of the design process.

Policy D4: Development proposals should be designed to ensure a safe and secure environment and reduce opportunities for crime.

Developers will need to ensure that crime prevention is considered as an integral part of the initial design of any development and not as an after thought. Development should incorporate the principles of 'Secured by Design'. In particular, they will need to demonstrate how their development proposal has addressed the following issues, with regard to designing out crime:

- Natural surveillance of public and semi-private spaces, in particular, entrances to a development, paths, play spaces, open spaces and car parks.
- Defensible space and the clear definition, differentiation and robust separation of public, private and semi-private space, so that all spaces are clearly defined and adequately protected in terms of their use and ownership.
- Lighting of the development, in particular, streets and paths.

- Design and layout of pedestrian, cycle and vehicular routes into and within the site, including how these integrate with existing patterns.
- Landscaping and planting, in particular, hiding places and dark or secluded areas should not be created.

The design and layout of access opportunities is of fundamental importance to designing out crime and needs careful consideration to avoid the creation of opportunities for crime. The 'Places Streets and Movement: A Companion Guide to Design Bulletin 32 - Residential Roads and Footpaths'7 provides advice on security issues in relation to the design of routes and connections. It emphasises that while clear and direct routes through an area for all forms of movement are desirable, they should not undermine the 'defensible space' of particular neighbourhoods.

Developers should, at the earliest stage, seek advice from the Bradford area Police Architectural Liaison Officer on designing out crime. A guide⁸ is currently being prepared by West Yorkshire Police in partnership with West Yorkshire Planning Authorities setting out detailed advice on designing out crime, to assist developers.

Policy UDP3: New development will need to ensure that the quality of the built and natural environment is maintained and where practical improved. In particular development should:

- 1) Promote sustainable design and enshrine the principles of good urban deign.
- 2) Maintain or enhance heritage assets, environmental resources and biodiversity.
- 3) Maintain or enhance the quality of the environment.

Policy D1: All development proposals should make a positive contribution to the environment and quality of life through high quality design, layout and landscaping. In particular they should:

- 1) Be well related to the existing character of the locality in terms of design, scale, massing, height and materials;
- 2) Provide a quality setting for the development:
- 3) Retain, and the appropriate enhance, important ecological and landscape features;
- 4) Not intrude on prominent skylines;
- 5) Relate to existing natural and built features, landmarks or views that contribute to the area:
- Incorporate adequate design arrangements for servicing, waste handling, recycling and storage;
- 7) Allow for flexibility to adapt to meet changing needs and circumstances and provide for access for those with physical disabilities:
- 8) Not harm the amenity of prospective or existing users and residents.

Good contemporary design which is sympathetic or complementary to its setting will be welcomed.

Policy D6: Development proposals including environmental improvements, highway improvements and traffic management schemes, should incorporate appropriate facilities to meet the need of pedestrians and people with special needs. In particular the design of develop-ment proposals should take into account the following:

1) Pedestrian links should have priority over other links including those for cycles and cars as

- appropriate to the development; 2) The layout of the development so that car parks do not deter pedestrian access and use;
- 3) The provision of adequate and safe pedestrian facilities within the development and safe access onto existing pedestrian links and network of routes;
- 4) Ensuring existing pedestrian links are not severed nor their safety or amenity harmed unless suitable alternative provision are provided by the developer.
- **Policy D7:** Development proposals including environmental improvements, highway improvements and traffic management schemes, should incorporate appropriate facilities to meet the needs of cyclists. In particular the design of development proposals should take into account the following:
- 1) Provision of safe convenient direct and coherent cycle routes and priority measures as appropriate to the development;
- 2) Provision of convenient and safely located cycle parking or storage facilities in appropriate new developments, including those in town centres, at transport interchanges, educational institutions and public car parks;
- 3) Development proposals should not sever existing or planned cycle links, to other parts of the cycle network or reduce their safety or amenity unless acceptable suitable alternative provision is made.

Council Contacts

Local Development Framework / Unitary Development Plan

The Local Development
Framework (LDF) Team produced
the Replacement Unitary
Development Plan and is currently
producing the family of documents
which will form the Bradford District
LDF.

Telephone: (01274) 433679 Fax: (01274) 434606

Development Services

Development Services processes planning applications and provides advice on planning matters. The Bradford District is divided into a number of area teams for Development Service purposes.

All of the different planning teams can only be contacted by telephone through the following switchboard number: (01274) 434605

The following are the Development Control contacts for these areas:

Bradford West: includes Heaton, Manningham, Thornton, Clayton, Queensbury, Great Horton and Buttershaw.

e-mail: planning.enquires@bradford.gov.uk

Bradford City Centre

e-mail: planning.enquires@bradford.gov.uk

Bradford East: includes Thackley, Idle, Greengates, Eccleshill, Fagley, Bowling, Odsal, Low Moor and Wyke.

e-mail: planning.enquires@bradford.gov.uk

Shipley: includes Shipley, Bingley, Baildon, Idle, Thackley, Wrose, Harden, Denholme, Cullingworth and Wilsden.

e-mail: planning.shipley@bradford. gov.uk

Keighley: includes the Worth Valley, Keighley, Riddlesden, Silsden, and Steeton.

e-mail: planning.keighley@ bradford.gov.uk

Ilkley: includes Ilkley, Addingham, Burley-in-Wharfedale and Menston.

e-mail: planning.ilkley@bradford. gov.uk

Design And Conservation

The Design and Conservation Group advises on matters relating to urban design, listed buildings and conservation areas.

Telephone: (01274) 433952 e-mail: conservation@bradford. gov.uk

Building Control

Building Control can provide you with all you want to know about buildings, building work, safe environments and how to organize public events safely. The Building Control Service has two offices in the District:

Bradford Tel: (01274) 433807 Keighley Tel: (01535) 618010

Rights Of Way

Tel: (01274) 432666 e-mail: rightsofway@bradford.gov. uk

Useful Organisations

West Yorkshire Police

The Police's Architectural Liaison Officers (ALO's) provide design advice on new development. www.westyorkshire.police.uk Trafalgar House, Nelson Street, Bradford BD5 0DX Tel: 01274 376698

ACPO

Association of Chief Police Officers for England, Wales and Northern Ireland. A not-for-profit company which operates the Secured By Design initiative and the Safer Parking Award 'Park Mark' initiative.

Secured By Design

www.securedbydesign.com contains design guidance and provides the details of firms with security products which are licensed by ACPO to use the Secured By Design logo.

The Park Mark

www.securedcarparks.com contains details about the Safer Car Parking: Park Mark initiative, plus a search facility for finding Park Mark approved car parks.

ACPO

7th Floor, 25 Victoria Street London, SW1H 0EX. Tel: 0207 227 3423 Fax: 0207 227 3400/01 e-mail: acpocpi@acpo.pnn.police.

uk

Bradford District Safer Communities Partnershir

Multi agency partnership of organisations working to make our district safer.
www.saferbradford.org.uk
www.saferbradfordinfo.org.uk
Safer Communities Team
Policy Development Service
4th Floor, Jacob's Well
Bradford BD1 5RW

BM Trada Certification

Provides an independent assessment of the quality of construction products. www.bmtrada.com
Tel: 01494 569700

British Board of Agrement

Provides independent information on the performance of building products. www.bbacerts.co.uk PO Box 195, Bucknalls Lane, Garston, Watford WD25 9BA Tel: 01923 665300

British Standards Institute

The Institute carries out independent testing and certification of products and produces the British Standards (BS).
www.bsi-global.com
389 Chiswick High Road,
London W4 4AL
Tel: 0208 996 9001

Building Research Establishment (BRE)

Research and useful information relating to construction, security and the environment. www.bre.co.uk BRE Garston, Watford WD25 9XX Tel: 01923 664000 e-mail: enquiries@bre.co.uk

CABE

Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment. A nongovernment organisation championing high quality design in the built environment. www.cabe.org.uk

English Heritage

www.english-heritage.org.uk 37 Tanner Row, York YO1 6WP Tel: 01904 601901

Government Office for Yorkshire and The Humber

City House P O Box 213 New Station Street Leeds LS1 4US www.goyh.gov.uk

Yorkshire Forward

Yorkshire Forward is the Regional Development Agency charged with improving the region's economy www.yorkshire-forward.com Victoria House 2 Victoria Place Leeds LS11 5AE

Tel: 0113 3949600

